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Abstract 
The essay estimates the relation between population size and municipal costs. Whether the 
efficiency in service provision in municipalities is depending on population size is discussed 
in Sweden as well as other countries. The relation is measured using two measures for total 
costs and two measures for “fixed costs” associated with having an additional decision level. 
The result give some support for a negative relation between costs and population size, but is 
sensitive to the cost measure and model specification. Whether the municipality is located in a 
rural or urban region is of importance for the results, which highlights the need of looking 
beyond population size in the discussion on municipal amalgamations. 
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 Introduction 1.
 
What is the optimal size of a municipality? Are there too many municipalities in Sweden? 
Could a municipality reform lead to cost savings? Those questions are part of an on-going 
discussion in Sweden. Politicians and representatives from unions as well as freestanding 
debaters have argued for a new municipality reform in Sweden with fewer and larger 
jurisdictions (Dagens Nyheter 2015-07-21). Proponents of a reform bring up cost savings as 
an argument for municipal amalgamations. According to these arguments, a larger population 
size will increase efficiency by taking advantage of economies of scale, internalization of 
externalities and a higher degree of specialization. Preference matching and local variation on 
the other hand speak in favour of small municipalities (SNS 2015a). 
 
The discussion is not unique for Sweden. It exists in many developed as well as developing 
countries, although the responsibilities and provision levels of the municipalities may differ 
between countries. A review of previous international research, estimating the effect of 
population size on cost, presents mixed results of both economies of scale, diseconomies of 
scale and nonlinear relationships. In the literature, economists have theoretical arguments for 
smaller as well as larger jurisdictions, similar to the discussion of centralization versus 
decentralization.  
 
The aim of this essay is to investigate whether population size has any explanatory power for 
the cost differences between Swedish municipalities.  Previous comparisons between Swedish 
municipalities have found higher costs for small municipalities. Sundström and Tingvall 
(2006) divides the small municipalities (<10 000 inhabitants) into five subgroups and find 
generally higher costs for small municipalities than the remaining, but lower costs for small 
municipalities close to a city.  Their study is based on descriptive statistics, which makes it 
difficult to sort out the effect of other factors than size. Another study by Berggren et al 
(2006) is based on regression analysis in order to control for underlying factors. That study 
found no statistically significant evidence for an effect of population size on municipal costs.  
 
An advantage for the current essay in comparison to the above studies is the use of panel data, 
making it possible to compare the results of an ordinary least squares model (OLS) with a 
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model using fixed effects.  By using fixed effects, time invariant characteristics for each 
municipality will be sorted out (Verbeck 2012).  
 
The effect of population size is tested on four dependent variables: Total costs, Deviation 
from Standard Cost, Cost of Political Activity and Administration Intensity. The regression 
results present some evidence for a negative relation between population size and total costs 
in both the OLS model and the fixed effects model. A relation between population size and 
standard cost is significant in the OLS model only and then only for rural municipalities. 
Regression analysis with Cost of political activity and Administrative intensity as dependent 
variables, which may represent fixed cost of another decision level, presents weak evidence 
for an effect of population size.  
 
 
 Background 2.
Organisation 
The municipality (kommunen) is the local government and the smallest of Sweden’s three 
governance levels; followed by the county (landstinget) and the central government (staten).  
The local government is responsible for about two thirds of the welfare services in Sweden. 
The amount of welfare services undertaken by the municipalities in Sweden   and other 
Nordic countries, are the highest in the world.  However, the municipal responsibilities are 
supervised and regulated by the central government (Söderström 1991). A number of 
instruments are being used to control and supervise the municipal level, including agreements 
and information as well as laws and regulations (Feltenius 2012; SOU 2007:10). The 
municipalities are obliged to supply a range of services. Among these are elderly care, 
education, childcare and waste disposal.  The municipalities are also able to supply other 
services such as housing and culture activities, even though these services are not obligated 
(Sundström & Tingvall  2006).  
 
Since each municipality in Sweden has a considerable responsibility for welfare services, it 
has been questioned whether small municipalities are capable of providing these services 
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efficiently. There are 290 municipalities in Sweden. 77 of them inhabit less than 10 000 
persons and 47 of them inhabit less than 8000 (2013). There have previously been several 
municipality reforms in order to reduce the number of municipalities. The last large 
amalgamation reform started 1962 and ended 1971. The number of municipalities was then to 
be reduced from 848 to 282. Part from a few changes, the division after the reform 1962-1971 
is still valid. The main objective of the reform was threefold:  
 -­‐ Higher efficiency in terms of cost-minimization of public services. 
 -­‐ Local democracy  - the inhabitants should have a good chance to influence the political 
decision making in their municipality. 
 -­‐ Local self-government. The regions should be large enough to decide and implement local 
political policies.  
 
8000 inhabitants were considered the minimum population size to accomplish the goals. The 
local self-government is an important feature of Swedish democracy and stated in the 1974 
constitution (Gustafsson 1980).  
 
Today, 16 per cent of the municipalities are populated by less than 8000 inhabitants, and there 
is a strong urbanisation trend in Sweden, which is particularly hurting municipalities with 
already small population size and low population density (SNS 2015a). Moreover is an ageing 
population putting pressure on the welfare state - a smaller working population must finance  
more services to elderly. This is pointed out as an especially difficult task for the small 
municipalities, mainly because small municipalities are more affected by these challenges, but 
also because they require higher specialization to create an efficient organisation. A report by 
SNS (2015a) report is discussing municipal amalgamations as one potential solution to but 
also more extensive cooperation between jurisdictions and the possibility of letting small 
municipalities have fewer responsibilities than larger ones.   
 
 
Financing 
 
The main source of financing for the municipalities is the income taxes. The local government 
set the tax rate. The tax base is varying widely across regions due to e.g. differences in 
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income, employment and retirement.  An equalization system (Kommunala 
utjämningssystemet) has been established in order to equalize the opportunities to provide 
good municipal services. The main components are cost equalization and income 
equalization. The first-named to equalize for differences in service need, the second to for 
differences in tax base (SCB 2015).  The system also level off for, among other things, cost 
differences between rural and urban areas to some extent (SCB 2015).  The system does not 
allow special grants on the basis of population size, but small municipalities are 
overrepresented among the net receivers of both income and cost grants. Economic incentives 
as a part of the equalization system are therefore often brought up in the discussion of small 
municipalities. The current system includes five parts, where of the cost equalization and 
income equalization make the largest part. Other than income and cost equalization there are a 
structural grant, an introduction grant and a regulation entry.1 The structural grant is mainly 
for regional characteristics, such as population density. The introduction grant was created 
after a reform 2014 to compensate municipalities negatively affected by the changes. (SCB 
2014)   
 
 
Income equalization   
 
The purpose of the income equalization part of the system is to equalize differences in tax 
payments between municipalities. As from 2005 the system is not primarily an 
intergovernmental grant between municipalities, but mainly financed by the central 
government. Some municipalities with very high tax base are still contributing to the system.  
 
The calculation of the income grant is based on the average taxable income (average 
taxpaying power). In addition, the central government adds 15 per cent of the current year’s 
average, and the net production is the equalization base (skatteutjämningsunderlaget). The 
municipalities will then receive a grant that corresponds to the tax equalization base, minus 
the actual tax base in the municipality. By the same calculations are municipalities with a 
higher tax base than the equalization base compelled to pay into the system (SCB 2015).  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  There	  is	  in	  addition	  to	  these	  parts	  a	  separate	  grant	  for	  services	  for	  disabled	  (LSS)	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The size of the grant is calculated using a measure that is to be independent of the individual 
municipality’s tax level. A municipality should not be able to affect its grant by lowering or 
rising tax rate. The calculated tax measure (den länsvisa skattesatsen) includes three parts: one 
factor correcting for differences in tax-switching policies, another factor deciding 
compensation level and a third factor which is the tax rate. All three factors are decided by the 
central government. The tax rate is based on the average tax rate in the country; the 
compensation level has been decided to 0.95 for receivers and 0.60 for payers to the income 
system.2 That is, municipalities that have a tax income lower than the calculated tax income 
are compensated for up to 95 per cent. The municipalities with surplus in relation to the 
calculated tax income are forced to abstain 60 per cent of the surplus. 
 
 
The compensation level should not be mistaken for the level of equalization. The level of 
equalization is the level after the equalization. 2014 was the level of equalization for receivers 
of grants between 113 and 115. For grant payers the level was between 115 and 126 (SCB 
2015).  
 
 
 
Cost equalization 
 
Except for income equalization, there is a system for costs, established to equal out the 
opportunities to give a certain service level for the mandatory municipal services. The system 
is motivated by need differences between municipalities that are beyond municipal power. 
Thus, the system does not equal out for differences in quality, service level or efficiency 
(SCB 2015). 
 
The cost equalization contains submodels for different sectors, or a cost existing in all sectors. 
There are 10 submodels in the equalization for which a standard cost is calculated. In opposite 
to the income equalization that is mainly financed by the central government, the cost 
equalization is more or less an intergovernmental transfer. In effect, municipalities with 
service need higher than standard cost receive a grant, and municipalities below pay a fee to 
the system (SCB 2015). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 0,85 percent for a income that exceed country average by 1,25  
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The standard cost is adjusted both for the number of individuals in need of services and the 
degree of services needed. Which factors that are used differ between submodels. For elderly 
care, the health status of the elderly in the municipality is included as well as age. For 
preschool, average time spent in preschool is taken into account. Hence, the standard cost 
corrects for need difference, but not quality and efficiency (SCB 2015). 
 
Changes to the equalization system 
 
The system has been changed a number of times during the last decades. Between 1996 and 
2004 the system was more or less self-financed, since the municipalities with a large tax base 
contributed to the system and municipalities with small tax bases received grants in the 
income system. In the same way contributed the municipalities with low costs, relative to the 
country average to the cost equalization system and the municipalities with high costs 
received grants (SCB 2014). The compensation level was high during this period. A 
consequence of the high compensation level was that municipalities with increasing tax base 
were being punished by a marginal contribution to the equalization system higher than 100 % 
(Söderström 2002).   
 
After reforming the system in the beginning of 2005, a system with state grants was 
introduced. In the same way as before, high income/low cost municipalities was contributing 
to the system and low income/high cost municipalities received grants. However, now grants 
from the central government were introduced to the system. During this period, the state 
government added a substantial sum. The objective was that net-contributing municipalities 
should keep a larger part of their surplus and thereby encourages growth (Statskontoret 2014). 
The system changed again 2014. Similar to the previous system, the state today guarantees a 
certain base level.  With the new system, net payers to the system have lower fees (SCB 
2014). 
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The equalization system and small municipalities 
 
The calculation of grants and payments in the equalization system is not dependent on size 
but rather dependent on the municipality’s costs and tax base.4 However, small municipalities 
are overrepresented among net receivers of cost grants and receive a higher average income 
grant. The table below presents the correlation between income/cost grants and population 
size. The correlation is calculated with the grant system between 2005-2013. 
 
 
Table 1 Correlation between equalization grant and population size 2005-2013 
Cost grant/payments -0.109 
Income grant/payment -0.254 
Source: The council of local government analysis (Kolada database 2015) 
 
 
The equalization system is necessary for municipalities with low tax power to keep somewhat 
competitive tax rate with well-off municipalities. In this way, municipalities can compete by 
being more efficient or providing demanded goods and services. However, the equalization 
system has been criticized for the incentive it creates. The cost grant is based on the average 
cost of service for a person of e.g. a certain age or disadvantage. An example brought up by 
Söderström (2002) is the cost gran calculation for elderly. The municipality receives a grant 
for a 80 year old inhabitant according to the country wide average cost of an 80 year old, 
creating an incentive for the municipality to attract 80 year olds that are healthier than average 
(Söderström 2002).  A high compensation level for the income grant may also create 
unwanted marginal effects. If the tax rate in a municipality is lower than the calculated tax 
rate, the total income can be lower if the municipality increases its taxpaying power more than 
country average (Söderström 2002). 
 
 
Although small municipalities are not treated as a special group in the equalization system, 
there is an incentive problem concerning small municipalities in particular. Sundström and 
Tingvall (2006) points out that the equalization system may effect the incentive to merge with 
another municipality, as the grants can change. It is possible that being overrepresented as net 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  are	  exceptions	  to	  this	  rule:	  If	  a	  school	  has	  less	  than	  350	  pupils	  in	  upper	  school	  (högstadiet)	  a	  special	  grant	  is	  given	  to	  the	  municipality.	  This	  is	  usually	  the	  case	  for	  small	  municipalities	  (population	  size	  <10	  000).	  Moreover	  can	  a	  municipality	  receive	  a	  special	  grant	  if	  pupils	  have	  to	  travel	  long	  distance	  to	  school.	  This	  is	  mostly	  the	  case	  for	  small	  municipalities	  in	  the	  northern	  part	  of	  Sweden	  (Sundström	  &	  Tingvall	  2006).	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receivers in the equalization system affects the cost for services. It is therefore important to 
include grants and fees when investigating a cost relationship empirically.  
 
The Danish reform 
Denmark introduced a reform to reduce the number of municipalities from 245 to 100 in 
2007. Denmark has, similar to Sweden, put a large welfare responsibility on the municipal 
level and the Danish reform has therefore contributed to the Swedish discussion on a 
municipality reform. The Danish Commission on Administrative Structure (2004) presented a 
report with a number of reform proposal, which was the basis of the 2007-year reform. The 
criteria were efficiency as well as quality and democracy. The commission draws the 
conclusion that at least 20 000, preferable 30 000 inhabitants in each municipality is 
necessary for the municipality to fulfil responsibilities (The Commission on Adminsitrative 
Structure 2004). 
 
In comparison with Sweden, Denmark has a low equalization level between municipalities. 
The average equalization was 2005 0.63. As a consequence of a lower level of equalization, it 
can be difficult for some municipalities to fulfil requirements. Groes (2005) argues that small 
municipalities in Denmark with low tax base have to lower quality in services in order to 
compete with other municipalities’ tax rates. The bottom level of 20 000 inhabitant should 
hence be seen in the light of this Danish system, where each municipalities has to “make it on 
their own”.  Groes (2005) however, argues that the reform not will help the poor 
municipalities to function better since the income differences are due to underlying factors 
other than population size.  
 
 
 Theoretical perspectives 3.
 
The theory on optimal municipal size and consequently the relation between population size 
and efficiency is based on fiscal federalism theory. Two influential economists in the area are 
Tiebout and Oates. The advantages of small communities are similar to those of 
decentralisation: it will lead to a higher degree of preference matching as the decision makers 
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have better knowledge of local preferences, but also competition between municipalities, 
which increase efficiency. Furthermore smaller communities may lead to a will to experiment. 
The advantage of larger communities are in the same way similar to those for centralisation: it 
will lead to higher efficiency due to economies of scale and internalization of externalities, 
and larger communities usually have a higher degree of specialization. 
 
 
The Tiebout model 
 
The starting point in Tiebout’s model is the government’s objective to provide public goods 
according to individual citizen preferences and finance the services through taxation. This is 
difficult task since it requires that the citizens reveal their willingness-to-pay for a good. Each 
citizen has an incentive to understate the willingness-to-pay as it will generate a lower tax 
payment. According to Tiebout (1956), the political mechanism cannot perform the task in a 
sufficient way, and it is of relevance to find a way to both reveal and satisfy individual 
preferences. Tiebout draws parallels to the private market where preference realization occur 
in the choice of goods. Literature prior to Tiebout had often assumed a central provision, but 
here is the local government an important factor. He starts with describing a case: an 
individual living in a community but is considering to move. A person with children might 
prefer a community with high spending on schools. For a person without children, other 
characteristics such as police service, roads and parks may be of more importance.  
 
As local authority makes it possible for local variation, a person may move to a city with a 
bundle of public goods closest to his or her preferences. Many communities give a higher 
degree of matching with individual preferences. As expressed by Tiebout: 
 
“ The greater the number of communities and the greater the variance among them, the closer 
the consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position” (1956, p. 418).   
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In order to reach an efficient outcome within this framework, several assumptions are made 
by Tiebout: 
 
- Perfectly mobile voters/consumer move according to their preferences 
- Voters/consumers have perfect knowledge of local differences 
- There are a variation of communities which consumers are able to chose from 
- No considerations of employment factors 
- No spill over effects between municipalities 
- An optimal city size exists for the each community’s bundle of public goods and is 
given by the lowest production cost of that public goods bundle. Communities with 
too few individuals for a cost minimizing production attract more individuals and vice 
versa. 
- Communities above and below optimal size try to decrease and increase population 
size respectively in order to reach lowest possible production cost.  
 
By moving, the individual is forced to reveal willingness-to-pay for public goods. 
Consequently, the total consumption of each good would be the sum of demand in each 
community and will be purchased at the market. The amount spent on each good would 
therefore reflect individual preferences and be similar to the usual market forces.  Each 
community is forced to be efficient and keep lowest possible production cost due to the 
competition between communities. Moving without transaction cost is a main feature in the 
Tiebout model as it makes it possible for individuals with similar preferences moving closer 
together and a more efficient provision of public goods is possible (Tiebout 1956). Preference 
matching is in the Tiebout model an argument for decentralisation, but can also be used as an 
argument for small rather than large jurisdictions (Dahlberg et al 2009).  
 
The assumption regarding moving and employment factors are strong, which will affect the 
possibility of an efficient outcome (Baldwin et al 2012). One can think of a number of factors 
affecting the transaction cost such as employment, living costs and social life. Another 
common example in relation to the Tiebout model is tax avoidance. If one community has 
lower ability to tax (e.g. high unemployment rate), the tax rate must be high to keep service 
level constant. The higher tax rate gives incentive to the working individuals in the area to 
move to a low tax community. Consequently, the taxable income in the municipality is even 
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lower (Söderström 2002). Movements from one community to another can also create costs if 
the price for a public good is size-dependent (Tiebout 1956; Oates 1972).  
 
Central state grants and intergovernmental grants 
 
With a more pragmatic view on the Tiebout model with municipalities competing with each 
other and select tax rate after the inhabitants’ preferences, there are some problematic factors. 
A municipality with higher employment and wages may pick a lower tax rate than other 
municipalities and still be able to offer same level of service. This stimulates a movement of 
income earners to the low tax municipality. The other municipalities are left with an even 
lower tax base and more difficulties to keep the service level high. It is also reasonable to 
except that non-movers with no income have higher service need than movers, for example 
retirees. A way to even out the situation is equalization through grants, which is common in 
many countries. Central grants, conditional as well as unconditional, are given but also 
intergovernmental grants, where equalization take place between jurisdictions without 
involving the central government. 
 
Unconditional grants can help equalling out ability to provide equal service (Oates 1972). 
However, incentives might be affected. If communities are compensated for health state in the 
population instead of the care they provide, the community has incentive to keep service costs 
low. There is also an incentive problem if the level of compensation is high. Then some 
communities might loose income if they increase tax base (Söderström 2002). Almenberg 
(2007) also emphasizes potential incentive problem with equalization concerning growth. A 
system with equalization based on need puts the natural factor price mechanisms out of 
action. The resources are no longer being allocated where the marginal productivity is 
highest. Thus, an efficiency loss occurs and the growth is depressed.  
 
City size 
 
In the model above, the optimal city size is created ”naturally” as each jurisdiction seeks the 
lowest possible average cost for each bundle of goods provided publicly. In an extension of 
the model, the city can be “full” and individuals wanting to live there are forced to seek a 
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substitute. If a perfect substitute not exists, there will be a failure in preference matching 
(Tiebout 1956). It is difficult to apply this thinking in the light of the demographic changes in 
Sweden today. Other economists have started in another end to determine the optimal city 
size, with club goods.  
 
Club good is  a closely related term to public good. A club good is a good with non-rivalry up 
to some point but with a possibility to exclude consumers.  In the simplest model of a club, all 
members are homogenous in preferences for the good and income. The club sets a level of 
good provision where the marginal rate of substitutions equals the marginal cost for all 
members; the cost is divided equally between members. 
 
A local public good in turn can be viewed as a special case of a club good. Here, the 
consumption is exclusive to individuals in a certain area. The payment is made through taxes, 
where the local government have legal authority. Public services on a local level can be 
understood through the framework of a local public good (Hindricks & Myles 2013). If the 
geographical population is assumed to be fixed, the theoretical analysis of optimal 
jurisdictional size will start with two incentives: By joint consumption of a good, the 
individual cost of that good decreases. However, by the joint consumption, the individual is 
forced to consume a different level or bundle of public goods than he or she prefers, assuming 
preferences are not fully homogenous. This way the joint consumption is causing a reduction 
in consumer surplus (Oates 1972). This reduction in consumer surplus will be expected to 
increase as the number of individuals in the area increases. The optimal jurisdictional size is 
given when the marginal decrease in cost equal marginal decrease in consumer surplus (Oates 
1972). However, one must keep in mind that many goods provided publicly are private in 
consumption and not a public good.  The public provision can be due to redistribute reasons 
rather than economic efficiency.  
 
Whether the goods are public or private, this simple modelling assumes no spill over effects 
of the community’s actions. If this assumption is relaxed and externalities exist between 
communities, this speaks in favour of larger jurisdictions, since it gives the possibility to 
internalise externalities (Oates 1972).  
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Small jurisdictions are also associated with an additional cost of public decision-making. 
Primarily, every community is in need of administration, buildings and paid politicians in 
order to function. Secondly, there is a cost in terms of time and effort to elect public officials 
(Oates 1972). Hence, fixed costs associated with anther decision level also speak in favour for 
larger jurisdictions. 
 
 
Economies of scale and scope 
 
The above-mentioned argument for large jurisdictions is mainly a lower average cost in 
provision of goods or services. A larger population will give lower average cost for the 
municipality, if the production is characterised by economies of scale and/or economies of 
scope. The definition of economies of scale is a constantly declining average cost of 
production (Hindricks & Myles 2013). Economies of scale are natural for a pure public good 
since it is non-rivalry in consumption. For goods rivalry in consumption, economies of scale 
often occur when the fixed cost are high. Naturally, a larger number of individuals splitting 
the fixed cost lead to a lower average cost.  
 
Economies of scale will be expected to find in capital-intensive production due to high fixed 
costs. In like manner, it will not expected to find in labour-intensive production (Wicker et al 
2014). An argument against finding economies of scale at the municipal level is that many 
services here are labour intensive (Dollery et al 2008). The local level provides not one, but a 
range of services and goods, presumably with different production functions. Potential 
economies of scale in municipal production must therefore be on the aggregate level (Byrnes 
& Dollery 2002). 
 
In the production of more than one good, economies of scope might occur. The definition of 
scope economies is when the cost for producing the goods together is lower than producing 
them one at a time. This implies that if economies of scale or scope exist, smaller 
municipalities have higher cost than larger ones, keeping the service level constant. An 
assumption here is that population size is a good proxy of output (Dollery et al 2008).  
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Municipal responsibilities 
 
In the normative framework of fiscal federalism, macroeconomic issues such as redistribution 
of income and economic stabilisation are often argued as the responsibility of the central 
government. The local level is expected to be too small to be successful with stabilization 
instruments and also due to the moving possibility of individuals; income redistribution might 
fail as individuals have an opportunity to move (Oates 1999).  For other goods are instead 
decentralization suggested. If the consumption of a good is restricted to a certain location or if 
the preference of a good depends on location, there is reason to adjust provision to local 
conditions. In this way, the welfare increases due to better preference matching, compared to 
uniform provision in the whole nation. With perfect knowledge, a central government could 
provide differentiated goods across jurisdictions. A more realistic assumption is however that 
a local government has higher knowledge of local specific preferences as well as consumption 
pattern and hence still provide the good or service more efficiently than the central level 
(Oates 1999). Moreover, local provision will increase efficiency through experimentation. 
With multiple small providers of a good it is easier to come up with new methods of 
provision, making the communities learn from each other (Oates 1999).   
 
 
 
Theoretical implications 
 
A summation of the theoretical framework gives us some simple implications: 
There are gains from decentralization – and smaller municipalities – as it leads to better 
preference matching. Decentralization gives opportunity for experimentation together with 
competition, which is possibly leading higher cost control. On the other hand are there also 
inefficiencies associated with decentralization. – and smaller communities.  Spill-over effects, 
i.e. externalities causing inefficiency together with lost economies of scale or scope. Lastly 
the municipal structure does often rely on equalization between municipalities and/or central 
government grants. Depending on how this is structured, incentive for non-efficient behaviour 
may be created. If small municipalities are overrepresented as receivers of equalization grants, 
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which is the case  in Sweden, inefficiency in relation to small municipalities may occur. One 
may from theory expect a negative correlation between population size and cost of services, if 
the provision is characterised by economies of scale, although many services provided by the 
local level are labour intensive. Although, one may expect higher cost of decision making for 
small municipalities in terms of administration and political activity since an organisation has 
to function regardless of the municipality size.  
 
 
 Previous research 4.
 
Economies of scale at the municipal level have been investigated by a number of researchers. 
The methods, dependent variables and country differ.  The Czech republic, with more than 
3200 municipalities has been the study object for two articles. Matějová et al (2014) studied 
the relationship in the Czech republic between per capita cost for preschool education and 
population size for municipalities. The authors found a non-linear relationship between 
population size and cost per capita. Soukopová et al (2015) did a similar study in the Czech 
republic but did a investigation of the effect of population size on six different spending areas: 
sport and leisure, culture, education, environmental protection and housing, using regression 
analysis. Their analysis shows no significant signs of economies of scale, and the authors 
further conclude that population size is not the most important factor in determining the 
public services provision.  
 
In “The Risks of Intuition: Size, Costs and Economies of Scale in Local Government” 
Callanan et al (2014) provide descriptive data for Ireland on efficiency measures with a 
review on previous literature as background. No evidence for the existence of scale effects in 
Ireland could be found, but the number of municipalities in the study were only 34. Byrnes 
and Dollery (2002) survey the existing literature on economies of scale for local authorities 
where population size is the explanatory variable. The survey presents mixed results: 8 % 
confirm a constantly declining cost, 39 % find no relationship, 29 % a non-linear relationship 
and lastly 24 % find evidence for diseconomies of scale. Byrnes and Dollery (2002) also 
criticize the use of population size as the explanatory variable, as it assumes a strong 
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correlation between output and number of inhabitants, which may not be true if the 
municipalities differ in e.g. age distribution.  
 
Some of the researchers have focused on administration cost/administration intensity and 
overhead cost explicit. That excludes variables such as education, police and health services 
or cultural activity. The advantages of focusing on overheads and administration are that those 
are costs which one can expect the citizen to desire cost minimisation, whereas in the above 
mentioned area, there are more choices embedded (Lawrence 2012). Blom-Hansen et al 
(2014) use the recent municipality reform in Denmark to investigate scale effect in local 
government. The research area is administration costs, which include e.g. cost of governance, 
administration and insurance. The authors find clear evidence for economies of scale in 
administration costs in Denmark, concluding that municipal amalgamations lead to cost-
savings in administration.  
 
The function and services of the municipal level differ between countries, which makes it 
difficult to apply results from other countries on Sweden.  Bergren et al   (2006) have 
investigated the effect of population size on municipal cost in Sweden with the use of 
regression analysis. The authors found no significant effect of population size on total 
municipal cost.  Sundström and Tingvall (2006) compare municipal costs between Swedish 
municipalities using descriptive statistics. The authors find difference between the small 
municipalities depending on municipality type.  As mentioned above, a demographic 
development in Sweden with urbanisation and an increasing fraction of elderly is hitting the 
small municipalities harder than other ones.  Sundström and Tingvall analyse municipal costs 
in small municipalities by dividing the municipalities into groups and in that make a 
distinction between rural and urban areas. There has been a decrease in population size for 
municipalities in rural areas, especially in northern Sweden. In opposite, small municipalities 
in urban areas, close to larger cities are not hurt by the development and have a cost structure 
similar to larger municipalities. Hence the study problematizes the focus on population size 
when studying municipal ability to fulfil responsibilities (Sundström & Tingvall 2006).  
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 Data and method 5.
 
This section will investigate whether the population size variable has explanatory power for 
municipal costs.  With the backdrop on the theoretical discussion, being small represents 
efficiency loss in terms of lost economies of scale. However, the empirical evidence for these 
theories has not been strong.  
 
Data set  
 
The board of municipal research (Rådet för kommun- och landstingsforskning) collects data 
on municipal costs and conditions directly from the municipalities, as well as from Statistics 
Sweden (SCB) and the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen). These 
observations are collected in the database Kolada (Kommun- och landstingsdatabasen). The 
panel data set, covering the period 2005-2013, provides measures to control for a number of 
underlying municipal characteristics, such as unemployment and population age. In addition, 
it is possible to control for time-invariant municipal characteristics due to the panel structure. 
 
Dependent variables 
 
Four dependent variables are used in the regression analysis: 
 -­‐ Total cost of municipal activity (SEK) -­‐ Deviation from standard cost (%) -­‐ Total cost of political activity (SEK) -­‐ Administration intensity (administrative personnel per capita) 
 
Total cost of municipal activity includes all types of service the municipality performs, both 
mandatory and voluntary. Differences in this measure may hence be due to efficiency 
differences as well as ambition and service level.  A second measure is the percental deviation 
from standard cost. The standard cost measure is explained in the section regarding the 
equalization system and is a cost measure used to calculate the cost grant. The standard cost is 
adjusted to service needs in the specific municipality but is not supposed to correct for 
efficiency differences. An advantage of using the deviation from standard cost is that several 
variables are controlled for in the standard cost, among the health status for elderly in the 
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elderly care standard cost, special needs in schooling standard cost etc. Hence, the standard 
cost represent the supposed cost a municipality, according to service need if having country 
average costs for services to those people. Thus, using deviation from standard cost, the 
variable is corrected for some factors that otherwise not would controlled for.  
 
The last two measures: total cost of political activity and administration intensity are included 
to capture the potential fixed cost of having an extra decision level, presented in the 
theoretical framework of fiscal federalism. Costs of political activity include both costs for 
boards and revision and support for political parties. Empirical research, including the results 
from Denmark, suggests higher costs of administration and overhead for small municipalities, 
and cost savings in administration by municipal amalgamations. Administrative costs are not 
available in the data set. An alternative measure for administrative burden is number of full-
time employees in administration (Stanley & Adams 1994). To measure the administrative 
burden, number of employees in administration divided with population size is used. For this 
variable, data is available year 2008-2013. Hence, the sample is smaller than for the other 
variables.  
 
Explanatory Variables 
 
Since elderly care, schooling and social services are mandatory municipal tasks, the fraction 
of elderly and fraction of young individuals may affect the municipal costs. The 
unemployment rate and fraction of foreign born are also group associated with high needs of 
municipal services (Ellegård 2013).  As mentioned in the previous section, the municipality 
income consists of the municipality’s own tax payments as well as grants from the 
equalization system. Since it cannot be excluded that grants create other incentive for 
municipalities than income from taxation, income grants and cost grants are controlled for in 
the regression analysis as well as tax base.  The fraction of services under municipal 
management (in contrast to private provision) is included as a control variable. It is possible 
that choice of public or private provision affects costs. Small municipalities have a higher 
degree of public management than other municipalities (SNS 2015b). 
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Lastly, dummy variables for rural or urban municipality are included.  The report by 
Sundström and Tingvall (2006) outlined above concerning the Swedish system suggests large 
differences between small municipalities close to larger cities and small municipalities in 
rural areas. Rural areas will be expected to have higher cost due to longer distances between 
the inhabitants. Municipalities near towns or cities can be expected to have lower costs as 
many inhabitants are commuting into the cities and use the city resources  
 
In order to sort out rural and municipalities close to cities, the division of municipality types 
created by the Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SKL), is used. The 
municipality groups are presented in table 1. Two dummy variables are created: rural 
municipality, including municipalities from group 8 and 10, and suburban municipalities, 
including municipalities from group 2, 4 and 5. 
 
Table 2 Municipality group 
1. Large city (storstad) 
2. Suburb to large city (förortskommun till storstad) 
3. Larger cities (större städer) 
4. Suburb to larger towns (förort till större stad) 
5. Commuting municipality (pendlingskommun) 
6. Tourism municipality (Turism- och besöksnäringskommuner) 
7. Goods producing municipality (Varuproducerande kommuner) 
8. Municipality with low population density (Glesbygdskommuner) 
9. Municipality in urban region (Kommuner I tätbefolkad region) 
10. Municipality in rural region (Kommuner I glesbefolkad region) 
Source: SKL (2015) 
 
Table 3 presents summary statistics over all variables. All variables in SEK are measured per 
capita and given in real prices (index=2005).  Table 4 presents correlation between population 
size and the other included variables. Population size correlates negatively with all four 
dependent variables. There is also a negative correlation between population size and grants 
from the equalization system as well as for fraction of elderly and unemployment. Fraction of 
foreign born and tax base have a positive correlation with population size. 
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Table 3 Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Total cost (SEK) 2609 47695.120 5546.553 34479.000 80416.020 
Deviation from standard cost (%) 2607 2.636 7.004 -100.000 29.800 
Cost of political activity (SEK) 2609 669.028 238.688 183.000 2257.813 
Administration intensity 1740 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.007 
Population size 2610 32199.290 63782.230 2421.000 897700.000 
Young 0-19 (%) 2610 23.337 2.486 16.647 31.411 
Elderly 65+ (%) 2610 20.883 3.891 9.900 32.300 
Forein born adults (%) 2610 12.836 6.918 3.000 51.600 
Unemployment rate (%) 2610 6.271 2.436 1.100 17.200 
Cost grant (SEK) 2610 455.144 2149.258 -3792.948 10093.920 
Income grant (SEK) 2610 6630.396 3392.549 -19325.760 14917.090 
Tax base (SEK) 2610 144029.400 18080.880 112816.000 290538.700 
Services under municipal 
management (%) 
2609 84.679 7.550 16.000 99.000 
Rural municipality (Binary) 2610 0.124 0.330 0 1 
Suburban municipality (Binary) 2610 0.383 0.486 0 1 
Source: The council for local government analysis (Kolada database 2015) 
 
 
Table 4 Correlation with Population Size 
Variable Correlation with population size 
Total cost (SEK) -0.187 
Deviation from standard cost (%) -0.179 
Cost of political activity (SEK) -0.301 
Administration intensity -0.157 
Young 0-19 (%) -0.002 
Elderly 65+ (%) -0.345 
Forein born adults (%) 0.345 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.054 
Cost grant (SEK) -0.109 
Income grant (SEK) -0.254 
Taxable income (SEK) 0.260 
Services under municipal management (%) -0.155 
Rural municipality (Binary) -0.109 
Suburban municipality (Binary) -0.111 
Source: The council for local government analysis (Kolada database 2015) 
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A missing variable in the regression is service quality. Part of the cost variation can 
presumably be due to quality differences rather than efficiency differences.  If quality is 
related with population size and total cost, the variable population size will be endogenous 
and the regression will give bias results.  Sundström and Tingvall (2006) find no signs of 
correlation between population size and service quality in schooling. A central government 
report finds no correlation between population size and quality in the local government 
welfare services in general. However, municipalities in rural areas report problem with 
recruiting qualified personnel in order to keep service level constant (SOU 2007:11).  
 
Estimation strategy 
 
The relation between population size and costs is estimated using two models; one OLS 
model and one fixed effects model. Since previous reports indicate an importance of 
municipality type, the OLS regression model is given by: 
    1     𝑦! = 𝛼! + 𝛼!𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙 + 𝛼!𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 + 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒!   + 𝜑[𝑅𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑙∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒]+ 𝛿[𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒]+ 𝜃𝑍! +   𝜀!    
 
Where Z is a vector of control variables.  The municipality types Rural and Suburban are 
binary variables (0 and 1) and included both individually and as interactive variables 
multiplied with population size. The coefficient 𝛽 for population size should therefore be 
interpreted as the coefficient of population size for municipalities that are not rural nor 
suburban municipalities, 𝜑 the coefficient for rural municipalities and 𝛿 for suburban. 
 
The second model is a panel data fixed effects model. Since the sample contains observations 
from all Swedish municipalities for a sample period of nine year, the observations cannot be 
treated as a random sample from a population. Fixed effects are therefore preferred over 
random effects (Verbeck 2012).  The fixed effects model makes it possible to control for 
time-invariant municipal characteristics, and hence avoid possible omitted variable bias. By 
using fixed effects, the relationship is estimated through the within-municipality variation 
(Cameron & Miller 2015).  The fixed effects-model sort out all time-invariant characteristics, 
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which makes it impossible to include other time-invariant dummy variables in the regression, 
such as municipality type. The fixed effect model is given by: 
 2     𝑦!" = 𝛼! + 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒!" + 𝜃𝑍!" +   𝜀!"   
 
 
In addition, it is reasonable to assume that the county council has an effect on the results. The 
income tax consists of two parts: one to the municipality and one to the county. The two 
government levels must therefore adjust to each other. Some areas of responsibility are also 
overlapping. To test the robustness of the results, dummy variables for counties are included 
in model (1). The results are presented in appendix (Table A) 
 
All economic variables are given in real prices per capita with 2005 as index year.  Dummies 
for each year are included to control for year effect. Robust standard errors - clustered on 
municipality - are applied to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelated error terms in 
both models.  
 
 
 Results 6.
	  
Table 5 below presents regression output for the dependent variables cost of total municipal 
acitivity with the OLS and fixed effects model. Table 6 presents the result from the same two 
models with deviation from standard cost as dependent variable. The results for costs of 
political activity and administration intensity are presented in table 7 and 8 respectively.  
 
All tables present the results for the OLS model and for the fixed effects model. To test 
whether the county affects the result, an additional model is created were dummies for county 
affliction is included in the OLS regression. The model change did not affect the significance 
of population size but resulted in a decrease of coefficient size. The regression result of this 
model is presented in appendix (Table A). 
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Table 5 Total Costs of Services 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Total costs of Municipal 
Services 
OLS 
Total costs Municipal 
Services 
Fixed effects 
Population size -0.003 -0.039*** 
 (0.002) (0.011) 
Rural area 5,413***  
 (1,378)  
Suburban  -1,213***  
 (449.400)  
Rural area*population size -0.148** 
(0.059)  
Suburban*population size -0.004 
(0.012)  
Young 0-19 (%) -110.800 -33.820 
 (175.900) (143.900) 
Elderly 65+ (%) 197.100 14.640 
 (143.600) (121.100) 
Foreign born (%) -20.650 -44.740 
 (29.550) (68.020) 
Unemployment rate (%) 257.800*** -91.450* 
 (94.760) (49.030) 
Income grant (SEK) -0.652*** -0.186 
 (0.207) (0.168) 
Cost grant (SEK) 1.007*** 0.432*** 
 (0.159) (0.130) 
Tax base (SEK) -0.124*** -0.047 
 (0.041) (0.037) 
Services under municipal 
management (%) 
139.200*** 
(26.950) 
41.540*** 
(15.310) 
Constant 50,119*** 50,646*** 
 (8,688) (8,493) 
Observations 2,609 2,609 
R-squared 0.728 0.719 
Number of municipalities  290 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6 Total Deviations from Standard Cost (%) 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Deviation from standard 
cost (%) 
OLS 
Deviation from standard cost 
(%)  
Fixed effects 
   
Population size -0.00000647 -0.0000263 
 (0.00000450) (0.0000240) 
Rural area 6.165***  
 (1.769)  
Suburban  1.971**  
 (0.777)  
Rural area*population size -0.000150* 
(0,0000884) 
 
Suburban*population size -0.0000521** 
(0.0000230)  
   
Young 0-19 (%) -0.746*** -1.136*** 
 (0.258) (0.393) 
Elderly 65+ (%) -0.307 -0.729*** 
 (0.189) (0.277) 
Foreign born (%) -0.253*** -0.484*** 
 (0.060) (0.172) 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.192 -0.249* 
 (0.162) (0.144) 
Income grant (SEK) 0.000402* -0.000563 
 (0.000225) (0.000343) 
Cost grant (SEK) -0.000271 0.000508* 
 (0.000188) (0.000294) 
Tax base (SEK) 0.0000248 -0.000158** 
 (0.0000453) (0.0000787) 
Services under municipal 
management (%) 
0.144*** 
(0.037) 
0.069* 
(0.037) 
Constant 9.445 68.170*** 
 (13.390) (17.090) 
Observations 2,607 2,607 
R-squared 0.295 0.091 
Number of municipalities  290 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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Table 7 Total Cost of Political Activity 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Political activity (SEK) 
OLS 
Political activity 
(SEK)  
Fixed effects 
   
Population size -0.000657** 
(0.000269) 
0.000583 
(0.00105) 
Rural area 73.990  
 (74.340)  
Suburban  118.300***  
 (30.470)  
Rural area*population size -0.0000755 
(0.00339) 
 
Suburban*population size -0.00239*** 
(0.000654)  
Young 0-19 (%) -23.240*** 2.834 
 (8.280) (11.730) 
Elderly 65+ (%) 0.986 7.349 
 (6.191) (7.747) 
Foreign born (%) -1.009 1.214 
 (2.274) (4.630) 
Unemployment rate (%) 4.562 -0.685 
 (5.713) (3.517) 
Income grant (SEK) 0.016* -0.0137 
 (0.00836) (0.0116) 
Cost grant (SEK) 0.0423*** -0.00742 
 (0.00732) (0.00808) 
Tax base (SEK) 0.00250 -0.00104 
 (0.00175) (0.00231) 
Services under municipal 
management (%) 
1.217 
(1.072) 
3.270*** 
(1.240) 
   
Constant 555.900 324.900 
 (479.300) (486.400) 
Observations 2,609 2,609 
R-squared 0.422 0.109 
Number of municipalities  290 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 Administration intensity 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Administration intensity  
OLS 
Administration 
intensity  
Fixed effects 
   
Population size -0.000000000355 -0.00000000147 
 (0.000000000467) (0.00000000282) 
Rural area -0.000235  
 (0.000246)  
Suburban  -0.000146  
 (0.000114)  
Rural area*population size 0.0000000119 
(0.0000000108) 
 
   
Suburban*population size 0.000000000445 
(0.0000000000212)  
Young 0-19 (%) -0.0000562* -0.00000910 
 (0.0000320) (0.0000607) 
Elderly 65+ (%) 0.00000490 0.0000149 
 (0.0000232) (0.0000403) 
Foreign born (%) -0.00000973* -0.0000269 
 (0.00000566) (0.0000340) 
Unemployment rate (%) -0.0000282 0.00000242 
 (0.0000203) (0.0000129) 
Income grant (SEK) -0.0000000312 -0.0000000127 
 (0.0000000326) (0.0000000425) 
Cost grant (SEK) 0.000000104*** 0.0000000355 
 (0.0000000242) (0.0000000394) 
Tax base (SEK) -0.0000000109 -0.00000000543 
 (0.00000000674) (0.00000000889) 
Services under municipal 
management (%) 
0.0000243*** 
(0.00000530) 
0.00000829 
(0.00000681) 
Constant 0.00384** 0.00309 
 (0.00174) (0.00267) 
Observations 1,739 1,739 
R-squared 0.326 0.067 
Number of municipalities  290 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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The OLS regression results on total costs presented in table 5, population size is significant 
for rural municipalities, but neither for suburban nor other municipality types. The size of the 
coefficient is -0.148 for rural municipalities. To set this number in a context, an increase in 
population size by 1000 inhabitants would lead to a cost saving per inhabitant of 148 SEK. In 
addition, rural municipalities have a significantly higher intercept than other municipalities. 
The correlation remains with deviation from standard cost as dependent variable, presented in 
table 6. In this OLS regression, both suburban and rural municipalities have significant 
negative correlation between population size and deviation from standard cost.  
 
There can be many reasons for cost differences that are not captured by the control variables 
in OLS model. By the use of a fixed effect model, time-invariant variables for each 
municipality are at least controlled for. In the fixed effect model is population size significant 
on total cost of services. The coefficient is -0.0385. An increase in population size by 1000 
inhabitants would hence lead to a cost saving per inhabitant of 38,5 SEK. The correlation 
does not remain when deviation from standard cost is the dependent variable. Hence, there are 
signs of a negative relation between population size and costs, but the effect is sensitive to 
which measure that is used and model specification.  
 
The two dependent variable that were included to measure some fixed cost of another 
decision making level – cost of political activity and administrative intensity – are presented 
in table 7 and 8. In the OLS model, population size significantly affects political activity 
negatively, except for the group with rural municipalities. No significant results are found for 
administration intensity.  
 
 Summarizing discussion 7.
 
Economic theory on municipality size suggests both advantages and disadvantages with a 
small population size. One of the advantages is better preference matching, even though 
services might be more expensive, due to lost economies of scale and many decision levels. 
Small municipal units have been pictured as a problem in the public debate for more reasons 
	  30	  
than cost, but the idea of cost savings is crucial. Recently, the minister of public 
administration suggested municipal amalgamations as one possible solution. But cost savings 
from amalgamations would only be possible if population size in itself has affect on cost, 
since other characteristics for the municipalities would not change (Berggren et al 2006). 
 
 The results in this study give some support for a correlation between population size and 
costs also after controlling for other demographic characteristics since a significant negative 
relation is found on total cost with both the OLS and the fixed effects model. However, the 
results are not that clear for deviation from standard cost as dependent variable. This may be a 
sign that the relation found in the former regression is due to service need differences rather 
than efficiency differences. The dataset does not have the need of childcare, special schooling 
and health care etc at hand. These are however to some degree included in the calculation of 
standard cost. This variable is hence adjusted to service need to a higher degree than total 
cost. A negative relation between deviation from standard cost and population size is 
significant for rural municipalities and suburban municipalities in the OLS regression, but not 
with fixed effects.  
 
Since the result is sensitive to choice of model, it is difficult to draw conclusions from the 
results. Caution must also be taken with treating the result as a causal effect, since the data set 
not provides measures to control for quality.  Increasing costs may be due to voter preferences 
rather than inefficiencies. Local variation is one of the advantages of decentralization in the 
theoretical framework. On the other hand, if there are efficiency differences due to population 
size, small municipalities might be more willing to lower quality than increase taxes, as a tax 
increase can lead to high-income earners moving. Since individuals can move, the causality 
may potentially also go in the other direction.  
 
A possible explanation for the weak evidence of a relation between population size and 
deviation from standard cost are the labour intensive characteristics of a large part of the 
municipal services, which is suggested by Dollery et al (2008). If the advantages of large 
jurisdictions are small, the gains of small municipalities and higher degree of preference 
matching might over overtop the disadvantages. Dahlberg et al (2009) have presented 
evidence for better preference matching in small municipalities. However, one must also 
include the aim and purpose of the municipalities into the discussion. Theory suggests 
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advantage of decentralization especially if preferences of types of services and service level 
differ across municipalities (Söderström 2002). Is this the case for the mandatory services 
provided by the Swedish municipalities? The main parts of municipal responsibilities are 
mandatory and regulated by the central government. The theoretical economic advantages are 
therefore unclear.  
 
The result does not give any clear support for an impact of population size on municipal costs 
and hence does not give clear support for cost savings by municipal amalgamations. That 
does not exclude other costs of having many municipalities. Externalities in form of 
difficulties cooperation between municipalities and other effects of boarders are inefficiencies 
that are not captured in a regression on total costs. Furthermore, the current municipal system 
relies on an equalization system, making it possible for municipalities with low tax base to 
survive. There is a risk that the high compensation level creates unwanted incentive for grant 
receiving municipalities. In the long run, incentive for growth might be affected. One of the 
changes made by the reform in Denmark was a reduction of the compensation rate as it was 
expected that larger communities could survive on their own. A risk, brought up by Groes 
(2005) is that municipalities will lower service level when compensation goes down.  The 
result does neither not speak against the view that small municipalities are in a difficult 
position for future supply of welfare services. Population size correlates negatively with 
fraction of elderly and unemployment rate and half of the municipalities in rural areas have 
less than 10 000 inhabitants.  
 
According to the theoretical framework as well as previous research, one can expect a 
negative relation between population size and cost of political activity or administration 
intensity. Since every municipality is in need of decision makers and a functioning 
organisation regardless of population, these could to some extent be treated as fixed costs. 
The results from the regression analysis do however give little support for this hypothesis. 
Some evidence is found for a relation between cost of political activity and population size in 
the OLS model for non-rural municipalities.  
 
In general, municipality type has explanatory power in the regression analysis. The results 
highlight the importance of including the type of municipality in the discussion of a municipal 
reform. The results presents both cost differences between rural and urban municipalities; and 
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different effects of population size. The effect of municipal type can only be observed in the 
OLS model and not in the fixed effects model. One must consequently aware of potential bias 
in the OLS estimation compared to the fixed effects since it does not control for all time-
invariant characteristics.  
 
The aim of this essay is to investigate the relation between population size and municipal 
costs. If cost savings can be made by a reform, population size alone must be of importance 
since other underlying variable do not change. The results presented are sensitive to choice of 
dependent variable and model specification but give some support for a relation.  A 
conclusion that can be drawn is that the problems for Sweden’s smallest municipalities are 
more complicated than small population size. Small municipalities are overrepresented in 
rural areas and are hurt by the demographic development. Population size also correlates 
negatively with variables associated with high costs such as fraction of elderly and 
unemployment. These underlying factors would not change by amalgamation. The results in 
this essay hence give some support for cost savings by a municipal reform but also highlight 
the problems with focusing on population size exclusively.  
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 Appendix 9.
 
Table A Regression results with county fixed effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Total costs Deviation from 
standard cost 
Cost of political 
activity 
Administrative  
intensity 
     
Population size -0.000812 -4.53e-06 -0.000630** -3.01e-10 
 (0.00188) (5.11e-06) (0.000282) (4.63e-10) 
Rural area 2,678** 4.859*** 23.89 -0.000408* 
 (1,089) (1.728) (69.83) (0.000243) 
Suburban  -691.0* 2.419*** 104.6*** -0.000145 
 (360.6) (0.731) (30.49) (0.000106) 
Rural area*population 
size 
-0.107** 
(0.0444) 
-0.000124 
(8.33e-05) 
-0.000270 
(0.00366) 
8.32e-09 
(1.13e-08) 
     
Suburban*population 
size 
-0.00225 
(0.00950) 
-4.38e-05** 
(2.19e-05) 
-0.00167*** 
(0.000538) 
9.64e-10 
(2.07e-09) 
     
Young 0-19 (%) 86.84 -0.624** -24.78*** -4.68e-05 
 (154.4) (0.288) (7.923) (3.38e-05) 
Elderly 65+ (%) 358.4*** -0.225 -3.285 1.23e-05 
 (123.1) (0.212) (6.562) (2.53e-05) 
Foreign born (%) 51.72* -0.183*** -2.426 -6.56e-06 
 (30.36) (0.0602) (2.314) (6.77e-06) 
Unemployment rate (%) 146.6 -0.322* -2.961 -3.00e-05 
 (93.13) (0.166) (5.439) (2.46e-05) 
Income grant (SEK) -0.371** 0.000567** 0.0116 -3.60e-09 
 (0.157) (0.000287) (0.00949) (3.06e-08) 
Cost grant (SEK) 0.700*** -0.000368 0.0486*** 8.90e-08*** 
 (0.140) (0.000237) (0.00694) (2.83e-08) 
Tax base (SEK) -0.0901*** 4.15e-05 0.000271 -7.06e-09 
 (0.0308) (5.73e-05) (0.00194) (6.39e-09) 
Services under 
municipal management 
(%) 
90.09*** 
(20.11) 
0.0760** 
(0.0374) 
-0.811 
(1.302) 
2.10e-05*** 
(5.38e-06) 
     
Constant 39,976*** 8.875 1,240** 0.00304 
 (7,404) (17.00) (536.8) (0.00195) 
Observations 2,609 2,607 2,609 1,739 
R-squared 0.820 0.353 0.490 0.386 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
